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Abstract 
 
Althout, scientific interest in the informal economy is from a recent date, there are 
already serious analyzes that define its forms, as well as standardized methods that 
measure its scope. In this text we will point out some theoretical dilemmas 
concerning informal economy as a sector emebeded  deeply in the society as a 
whole. The informal economy sector can be understood as a rational response by 
people to the way of life, the environment, the way in which the institutions work, 
the economic development of society or the culture itself - despite the fact that 
some consequences have an irrational character (exploitation, discrimination, 
violation of human rights and freedoms). Special attention is paid to political 
clientelism and corruption as forms of informal economy with a special focus on 
the situation in R. of Macedonia.  
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In scientific literature, as well as in social practice, are used various names for the 
informal economy. Researchers and other social actors use different terms, that is: 
gray economy, black, hidden economy, shadow economy, irregular economy, and 
other terms.  Although each of these terms has its own specificity and different 
connotation, it is common for all of them that they are outside the official 
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accounting of a given state and belong to the informal sphere.  Given the fact that it 
is a phenomenon that is characteristic of almost all countries in the world, and that 
in some countries it is more present than in others, analysts avoid giving a general 
definition by pointing to the need for local definitions that will express regional 
specifics (Schneider and Williams, 2013).  Without a precise definition of the 
informal economy, it cannot be measured as such.  According to Schneider and 
Williams, the informal economy refers to the deliberate concealment (hiding from 
public agencies) of market economic operations that are essentially legal.  Such 
hiding is made for the following reasons:  
● avoiding paying especially the VAT or some other taxes,  
● avoiding the payment of social security contributions, 
● avoiding achieving certain standards required by the labor market, such as 
minimum wages, maximum number of working hours, safety standards, 
etc.,  
● avoidance of compliance with certain administrative obligations.   
This does not include the illegal, so-called underground operations and the 
informal (self-sustaining) household or family economy. Within the framework of 
regional analyzes, there is an attempt to define the informal economy (Center for 
Study of Democracy, Sofia, 2011) where the following types of (in) formal 
economy are differentiated:  
● formal economy (legal and declared/reported), 
● economy for own support (legal, but undeclared): household/family 
production, unpaid volunteer work, self-employed persons, and small 
businesses, 
● illegal (black) economy (illegal and undeclared) which includes illegal 
operations or the unlawful production of goods, as well as the economic 
operations carried out by illegal entities, 
● undeclared (gray) economy (legal, but not reported or not fully reported); 
this involves non-reporting or incomplete reporting of legal business 
operations, failure to report all hired staff, and failure to report full income, 
tax evasion, and avoidance of payment of social security and healthcare 
contributions. 
 
The interest in systematic study of the informal economy in the Republic of  
Macedonia is of recent date.  The very term informal economy for many people is 
unknown, or rather obscure.  The term gray economy is often used.  According to 
official documents, the informal economy refers to the deliberate avoidance of 
declaration/reporting (registration) of legal business operations in order to avoid 
taxation.1 
According to Martha Alter Chen, the informal economy sector does not represent a 
phenomenon separate from society as a whole. The informal economy sector is not 
                                                          
1 Action Plan for reducing the informal economy, 2015, Ministry of Labor and Social 
Policy, R. of Macedonia. 
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a secondary economy that would complement the primary one.  It is part of the 
socio-economic context in highly developed, but also in less developed economies.  
In the post-World War II period, long-term economic growth per se was believed 
to lead to a reduction in the informal economy.2 However, both in developed and in 
underdeveloped countries, a significant increase in informal employment has been 
registered at the end of the 20th century.  The transition from mass to flexible 
production has increased the number of atypical jobs that are below standard 
working conditions and without social benefits.  There is also a growing number of 
small businesses and workers working from home to survive.  Especially in 
transition economies when massive bankruptcy of large state enterprises occurs, 
many workers would accept informal employment just to survive.  The informal 
economy in a Macedonian context means resistance to the institutions and 
government-created regulations, but at the same time the opportuneness of groups 
close to the decision-making centers (Martha Alter Chen, 2012).    
 
In the analysis of the informal economy, we cannot but introduce the international 
aspect, that is, globalization.  Small and medium-sized enterprises (that is, home-
based and/or family-run small businesses) are very difficult to withstand global 
competition, and many are limited by the closed local environment and informality.  
The informal economy can be viewed as a sector that gives many people the 
opportunity to overcome poverty (Martha Alter Chen, 2012).  This is especially 
true for women - who due to their low qualifications and inadequate education - 
have hard time finding work in the formal sector.  Thus, the informal economy 
sector can be understood as a rational response by people to the way of life, the 
environment, the way in which the institutions work, the economic development of 
society or the culture itself - despite the fact that some consequences have an 
irrational character (exploitation, discrimination, violation of human rights and 
freedoms).  We find one of the examples in unpaid family workers.  In the 
Republic of Macedonia, 50% of the respondents said that they are unpaid family 
workers who do not have any social benefits.  From the perspective of its actors, 
the informal economy means flexibility and innovation.  
 
Research in the Republic of Macedonia shows that the reasons for the informal 
economy lie in the low confidence of the citizens towards the institutions and the 
resistance to the rigid regulations created by the government.  21.6% of the 
respondents would prefer to be an undeclared worker with a high salary – rather 
than a legally declared worker with a low salary, implying formally paid social 
security and healthcare contributions.  In addition, an important reason is the 
opportunism of groups connected to decision-makers (CRPM, 2015).  The informal 
economy is based on close ties and connections and represents the continuity of the 
traditional economy.  Informal or undeclared workers - although uninsured, low 
paid, and dependent self-employed - are also seen as "survival experts" or 
                                                          
2 A concept known as the Lewis Milestone, 1954. 
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"entrepreneurial survivors" (Gallin, 2001: p. 531-532; Valenzuela, 2001).  This is 
especially specific for the Republic of Macedonia and its local transitional context.  
According to the research on the informal economy in Macedonia, 68.5% of the 
surveyed citizens believe that it is an inevitable part of everyday life in the country 
(CRPM, 2014).  This in turn tells us that the informal economy sector has 
legitimacy and responds to the needs of a very wide market - becoming an 
economy by the poor for the poor.  
 
Business operations in the informal sector can be "economically efficient and 
profitable, although they are small-scale and restricted by simple technologies, 
small capital, and lack of connections with the other (“formal”) sector" (ILO, 
1973).  In many cases, they help maintain the subsistence of the most vulnerable 
groups in society. 
 
The data on informal economy measurements contribute significantly to the 
analysis of such economy.  There are various methods by which its volume is 
measured.  Among the methods used is the calculation of the consumed electricity 
according to which the informal economy accounts for 24% of GDP.  According to 
the Labor Force Survey (Novkovska, 2013), the informal economy in the Republic 
of Macedonia is 47% of the GDP, while it is 46.3% according to the Multiple 
Indicators - Multiple Causes (MIMIC) model.  According to the studies conducted 
in the Republic of Macedonia (CRPM, 2015), 40% of the respondents pointed out 
that they receive a substantial part of their salaries paid directly in cash, that is, not 
via bank account.  However, it should be noted that the basic feature of the 
Macedonian economy is its low GDP, which is only 37% of the European Union 
average or mere $4,000.  
 
In the theoretical consideration of the informal economy, there are various theories 
about the causes that trigger it.  According to the dominant, neoliberal paradigm, 
the informal economy is on the rise in circumstances when there is excessive 
regulation of the economy (rigid red-tape procedures).  Economic operators in such 
circumstances - to avoid expenses (and time for registration as an expense) - 
operate in an informal manner.  According to analysts who belong to the school 
favoring social regulation of the economy - the informal economy is on the rise in 
open and free market conditions.  The Eurofound report (Eurofound, 2013) - where 
the link between the economic recession in 2008 and the development of the 
informal economy in the 27 EU member states was explored - shows that the 
neoliberal type of austerity measures (tax cuts, deregulation and minimal 
intervention by the state) is associated with the increased volume of the undeclared 






2. INFORMAL ECONOMY AS POLITICAL CLIENTELISM  
 
The informal economy becomes specifically expressed in context of political 
clientelism and corruption.  According to Jean Francois Medard3, the term 
clientelism refers to an established personal relationship of reciprocity and 
interdependence between two individuals as such.  Clientelism was mentioned 
even in the classical Greek and Roman period.  In ancient Rome, a client was 
considered a person with an inferior social status in relation to his social sponsor or 
'boss' from whom he received material support or other kind of protection, and in 
return, such client showed loyalty, gave election support, or showed public political 
approval/consent at the Roman forums.  In the beginnings of the Western liberal 
democracy, the capacity of local politicians was measured according to the volume 
of favors that they could deliver to their local clients, that is, supported persons. 
Clientelism develops particularistic relationships, as opposed to the universalistic 
ones that are provided for by the laws.  A person develops this kind of 
particularistic relationships because he expects a certain favor in return, because he 
is a kin or a member of the same group (clan, tribe, or party).  A typical example of 
clientelism is when a poor man chooses a wealthy man for a godfather or main 
wedding witness; afterwards the entire family of the poor man expects social 
protection and social sponsorship from the wealthy man (Medard, 1976).  In 
modern circumstances, clientelist relationships have started losing family or 
religious peculiarities thus becoming anonymous and mainly based on the labor 
market.  In addition, modern clientelism has lost its personal aspects transforming 
itself into an impersonal political machine, that is, clientelist relationships have 
become institutionalized with stable expectations by the participants (S. Cvejić, 
2016). 
 
Political clientelism is the instrumentalization and introduction of personal 
relationships in the domain of politics. Clientelism is essentially a process of barter, 
trade, or rather an exchange, while political clientelism is a special kind of social 
exchange where there is a debtor-creditor relationship between two political 
entities in unequal social position.  Thus, a person with a higher socioeconomic 
status (for example, a manager or social elite member, a 'boss') offers protection or 
some other favor to a person with a lower status (client) who, in turn, offers his 
loyalty, support or is at the personal disposal of the boss.  The client - that is, the 
person with a lower status who receives a certain favor - loses his or her personal 
independence.  If such relationships are practiced within the family and in context 
of extended family kinship and in-laws, then it is a matter of nepotism; on the other 
hand, if the scope of the relationship becomes very large, then one can talk about 
tribalism.  Political clientelism thus represents an exchange of informal character 
and goes beyond formal principles of operation.  The content of the social 
                                                          
3 Jean-François Médard, LE RAPPORT DE CLIENTELE, du phénomène social à l’analyse 
politique, Revue française de science politique,  Année 1976,  Volume 26,  Numéro 1,  pp. 
103-131. 
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exchange varies accordingly.  It could be employment, certain extraordinary 
income, commission fee, membership of various committees, customs relief, tax 
evasion, obtaining a prestigious function, and other things.     
 
Clientelism as a concept approaches the framework described by Marcel Mauss in 
his book called The Gift.  Clientelism means a reciprocal exchange between two 
persons, or groups that establish a personal relationship, in the past visibly based 
on kinship or tribal ties, on shared religious affiliation or status affiliation, as in the 
case of the exchange of the so-called potlatch.  Although this exchange assumes a 
form of gift giving, that is, it is voluntary - it is nevertheless mandatory; free of 
charge - but with a calculated interest.  According to Mauss, it is about arbitrary 
(informal) legitimization of the exchange in terms of the scope, type, or time of 
giving, which P. Bourdieu calls symbolic violence.  The economic dimension here 
has variable amplitude.  This kind of exchange cannot be reduced to its economic 
dimension, which is obvious in reciprocity - the obligation to give a gift, the 
obligation to receive the gift, and the obligation to reciprocate with a gift.  
Relationships in this traditional exchange are interpersonal, in most cases bilateral, 
followed by affective association, with many rituals where the usefulness comes to 
the foreground.  
 
The revival of clientelism, especially present in transitional societies, is the 
outcome of the revival of traditional relationships in the domain of management of 
public goods and the way of accessing them.  The transition to Western-style 
democracy is slow.  A specific approach to institutions is characteristic - as if these 
institutions were constructed by an external factor, as a kind of implant that is 
unable to perform the right function.  Here it is about the institutions of different 
kind: educational, health, social, and other.  This approach is shared by the political 
elites and by the citizens who reproduce the clientelistic relationship whose 
intensity over time is multiplied.    
 
According to Peter Blau, political clientelism is an exchange followed by power 
and debt that cannot be paid back.  If there is a possibility to pay the debt, then the 
clientelist relationship could be terminated as such.  From a psychological point of 
view, persons who hold some public office are, in a way, called to help, in the 
sense of noblesse oblige, while their clients are called to pay back or reciprocate, if 
with nothing else then with loyalty.  In this context, operates the principle: 'I will 
help the one who has helped me'.  This shows the main difference that exists 
between the clientelism and the violent coercion, although in clientelism, 
compulsion is not excluded.  
 
The terms political clientelism and corruption are often considered identical, 
primarily because of the effects, that is, the phenomena that they cause in social 
practice.  The term corruption is associated with a single market transaction and 
basically represents an economic exchange as such.  Political corruption is a 
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political decision so made that is aimed at gaining money, while political 
clientelism is an exchange of favors for the sake of obtaining votes in the elections.   
 
The main goal of political clientelism is to maintain and be in power, as well as 
material benefits that are acquired at the expense of the state.  Political clientelism 
is a kind of "disease" of the state, and therefore, there is an unproductive spending 
of public resources with a strong tendency to slow down the economic 
development as a whole.4 Over time, the clientelist system becomes rooted in 
culture, gaining legitimacy, while the entire economy is transformed into a kind of 
lease-and-rent-based system.  In societies in which clientelism is deeply rooted in 
culture, economic operators, instead of investing in economic activities, tend to 
engage in the chain of transactions by becoming accomplices.  Basically, the whole 
economy comes down to being a client, a mediator, an expert, or the like, to get 
hold of some of the public resources.   
 
Studies carried out in African countries offer a clearer picture of the characteristic 
features of clientelism and its consequences.  Namely, in these countries, political 
clientelism often leads to political crises, but also to civil violent fights.  Namely, 
since the clientelist states lose the capacity for productive management of public 
spending, they show "thirst" for new resources; such "thirst" is settled by the 
introduction of new taxes or new foreign credits, which are followed by exercising 
even greater control and with new administrative repression.  Under rare resource 
conditions, power tends to be highly centralized, down to the very leader and a 
narrow elitist core around him.  The clientelist strategy is, in essence, severely 
discriminatory in relation to other people who have not become involved in the 
clientelist system.  The exclusion from the system creates great dissatisfaction with 
non-clients becoming involved in the opposition, which then acquires new 
potential to launch a political crisis to win power and access to resources from 
which they were excluded.  Thus, the system - where political clientelism becomes 
dominant - starts to crumble from within, i.e., it becomes self-destructive.  This 
mechanism of the functioning of clientelism in Africa is recognized in our 
environment as well.  The data and analyses of our context are not significantly 
different.  In the transition countries, along with the development of democratic 
institutions, measures for strict fiscalization and income control have also been on 
the rise.  There is a complete centralization of the budget revenues and 
expenditures by the executive branch and the creation of institutions for the violent 
collection of debts that are carried out by pressure, often of a physical nature.  In 
essence, the weakened economy is the new energy of clientelism. 
 
The clientelist state is a patrimonistic state.  This is characterized by the 
privatization of the state where the holders of certain public offices (political or 
                                                          
4 Cartier-Bresson, 2010, «Le comparatisme à la croisée des chemins : La corruption entre 
analyse normative et positive». In: Le comparatisme à la croisée des chemins Autour de 
l'œuvre de Jean-François Médard. Karthala, 2010 
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administrative) use their position and their powers as if they were inherited, or as if 
they were some kind of personal property.5 This is about the usurpation of powers 
and public goods by the holders of public offices.  This leads to the formation of a 
so-called political class, whose members use the state as a source of power, social 
status, income, wealth, and other benefits.  The main goal of the patrimonistic state 
is to maximize the personal benefit of the so-called political class and maintenance 
of power by giving certain concessions to its clients.  Patrimonistic states do not 
create their budgets according to certain economic criteria, but in context of how to 
maintain power (Buchanan and Wagner, 1977).  
Very often as clients of political elites are the companies, that are tolerated in terms 
of non-payment of tax.  This, on the other hand, leads to a reduction in the volume 
of public goods, but also to an increase in informal employment, which are seldom 
controlled by tax and labor inspections.6 According to European surveys, 9.7% 
(EWCS, 2013) of the respondents answered that non-registration of workers is the 
most serious factor of the informal economy.  Salary given in cash-money 
envelope.  According to the labor force surveys, 28.3% of the Macedonian net 
average salary (345 EUR) is received in cash-money envelope (CRPM, 2015).  
 
According to studies conducted in Serbia, a significant segment of public resources 
is transferred into the hands of individuals via public enterprises and public 
procurement. Trustworthy and verified party members regardless of their education 
or expertise are appointed as general managers of public (state and municipal) 
enterprises, as well as members of their executive boards; that is, party activists 
who use public resources for individual gain or for the party in power (SeCoNs, 
2016).  Often, tenders are awarded to economic operators who are close to the 
political elites.  There is a well-developed practice of adjusting the tender and 
public procurement criteria according to known and familiar participants, by 
informally informing such known participants about the conditions.  
 
In the Republic of Macedonia, political clientelism is promoted by the high rate of 
unemployment that creates enormous pressure for employment especially in the 
public sector.  Party-initiated employments in the Macedonian public sector set the 
regional records.  The party headquarters, which are located in each town district, 
in each settlement or larger village, have become employment centers for party 
members and party sympathizers.  This form of clientelism carries out a complete 
devaluation of human resources, emphasizing party loyalty and party commitment 
as crucial in finding a job.  Informality here is reflected in the selection of 
jobseekers and the suspension of objective criteria.  Such employment weakens the 
economy by stimulating the youth to be lazy and politically opportunistic, rather 
                                                          
5 Médard, J. F., D’Etat Patrimonialisé, Politique africaine, n° 39, septembre 1990, p. 25-36.  
6 Cartier-Bresson, J., Tiers-Monde A., Corruption, libéralisation et démocratisation, 2000, 
Volume 41, Numéro 161, pp. 9-22. 
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than promoting entrepreneurship, skills development and labor productivity 
development.  The non-clients, without alternative, are inclined to leave the state. 
 
According to the research made by the Center for Research and Policy-Making in 
the Republic of Macedonia (CRPM, 2015), the country is dominated by a 
politically motivated economy.  Thus, 33% of imports relates to companies close to 
the government that do not pay customs duties.  In turn, they finance the political 
parties (CRPM, 2015).  In this context, one should note that only six companies 
account for 50% of total imports into the country.  According to the same survey, 
69% of companies face informal or undeclared competition. 
   
The reasons for clientelism are found in pre-industrial traditions and domination of 
the pre-modern type of logic, in the sense when Max Weber speaks about the 
various sources of power.   
 
3. POLITICAL CLIENTELISM AND CORRUPTION 
 
Clientelist relationships show corruption at the moment when clientelism - as 
social exchange from the domain of the private - is transferred to the public sphere 
(politics or administration).  Corruption means the interference of private 
relationships in relations that need to be public.  In ancient Rome, clientelism was 
not considered an illegitimate practice, in contrast to corruption that was 
illegitimate and illegal.  Corruption is an exchange based on monetary transactions 
that take place in short time, while clientelism implies relationships of lasting 
character based on loyalty and friendship.   
 
The notion of corruption is closely related to democracy, what Max Weber calls 
institutionalization, that is, the rule of law or the law-based state.  Lack of 
transparency and lack of political accountability cause and trigger corruption as 
such.  One can talk about existence of corruption in democratic states because the 
reasons for its existence lie in the evasion of democratic mechanisms and in the 
violation of human rights and freedoms by which all individuals are equal.  
According to Bresson, there is old and new type of corruption.  The old type of 
corruption is characteristic of the Western states and comes to the fore at the time 
of state interventionism (protectionism) where it gives the right to make certain 
decisions for allocation of public funds to certain offices and functions.  The new 
type of corruption is characteristic of states that adopt the Western system of 
democracy and allow the elites to deviate from the proclaimed goals.  The two 
types can coexist, but in transition countries, the causes lie in poverty, the scarcity 
of public goods, incompetent administration, low wages in the administration, and 
clientelism leading to the appropriation of scant public goods.   
 
Clientelism is based on particularism and protections that are contrary to the formal 
universalism of laws.  Clientelism is associated with a particularistic redistribution 
390
that deviates from the public interest.  Analysts7 often cite the example of some 
African countries where the relationship between corruption and political 
clientelism is clearly visible.  There, political power is maintained through a 
rational practice of distributing public goods (employment, protection, permits, 
etc.) in return for political support.  The money - which the government collects 
from corrupt economic operations, especially through the international economy - 
must be reinvested in political like-minded people (that is, the political clients).  If 
money is fully appropriated or deposited abroad without any part of them being 
distributed locally, then the position is threatened, and power of governments and 
elites becomes weaker.  The stability of political power has its own dear price.   
 
Corruption has not only an economic side, but also a political one because it 
supports a wide range of political clients who are necessary to support the policies 
of the government.  When a head of state or of government appoints someone as 
director of a public company or a state institution, then he makes a private 
investment expecting broader support.  When corruption assumes large scale, 
social ties with political supporters can break up, thus contributing to the loss of the 
legitimacy of this necessary core.  It is thought that high corruption contributed to 
the collapse of ancient Rome because the clientelist relationship with the Roman 
military and the Roman citizens that were their supporters was terminated.   
 
It can be concluded that corruption causes clientelism and vice versa.  If corruption 
is widespread, it is then very difficult to recognize and define such corruption.  In 
such a situation, it is not possible to separate the corrupted from the others who 
corrupt.  Apart from the economic consequences of corruption that are most visible 
in the domain of inadequate consumption and the destruction of public goods for 
non-productive purposes, corruption also negatively affects the use of human 
resources by devaluing competences and talents.  In conditions of massive 
corruption, quality human resources - instead of being engaged in productive 
(entrepreneurial) operations - are engaged in a corrupt employment system or seek 
a way to be engaged in transactions involving the distribution of public goods.  
 
                                                          
7 Médard, J. F.,  Clientélisme politique et la corruption, Revu Tiers Monde t. XLI, No 161, 
2000.  
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Table 1. Key problems in the Republic of Macedonia (2016) (percentage of 
the population that identify ed the corresponding factors as a problem) 
Category  
1. Unemployment 50.7% 
2. Political instability 46.0% 
3. Poverty  39.3% 
4. Low income 39.3% 
5. Corruption 30.9% 
6. High prices 23.2% 
7. Crime 17.4% 
8. Ethnic problems 12.3% 
9. Pollution of the 
environment 
9.6% 
10. Healthcare 7.3% 
11. Education 5.4% 
 
Source: MCIC Report on Corruption Assessment, 2016. 
 
According to the same research, the main reasons for the prevalence of corruption 
are found in political elites and their thirst for rapid wealth, then in the inefficiency 
of the judicial system in the fight against corruption, and in the disregard of the 
laws.  In the Macedonian case, there are not enough arguments to confirm the 
thesis that corruption is a phenomenon inherited from the former socialist regime, 
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